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TO UNKNOWN MALE: NOTICE OF PLAN FOR




Jeff and Lisa had a long-term relationship that ended badly.' Lisa
was pregnant with Jeffs child when they broke up. Jeff was unaware
that he had fathered a child until he heard from a mutual friend that
Lisa had given birth and had identified a loving couple to adopt the
child. Jeff contacted a lawyer to assert his parental rights as soon as he
heard Lisa was placing their child up for adoption.
TheJoneses had been hoping to adopt a child for many years and
were excited to meet Lisa through a private adoption agency. State
law requires consent for the adoption from the mother and any man
identified by the mother as the child's biological father. Lisa, how-
ever, lied to the adoption agency, telling them that she did not know
the identity of the baby's father, and gave her consent for the Joneses
to adopt her child. The adoption proceeded normally-withoutJeff's
consent. A day after the baby was born, the Joneses took their new-
born home. Several months after initiating the adoption proceedings,
however, Lisa and the Joneses were informed that Jeff was contesting
the adoption in court.
After years of court battles, the state supreme court finalized the
adoption. Although Lisa hid her pregnancy from Jeff, the court held
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., Public
Administration, Michigan State University. I would like to thank my husband, Doug
McKenna, for his encouragement and support. Additionally, I owe a special thanks to
the Notre Dame Law Review staff for their hard work and valuable feedback.
1 This is a hypothetical situation based on actual contested adoption cases and
was not intended to describe an actual event. See, e.g., In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324,
326-27 (Ill. 1995) (describing adoption proceedings where the biological mother
told the biological father their baby had died so she could place the child for adop-
tion without the father's consent); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992)
(describing adoption where the biological mother intentionally misidentified the bio-
logical father when placing child for adoption).
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that Jeff did not have any parental rights to his child because he had
not provided financial or emotional support to Lisa or his child fol-
lowing the child's conception. Years after the adoption proceedings
were initiated, the respective rights of the parties were finally defined.
Jeff invested emotionally and financially only to discover that he had
no legally recognized rights in his child, while the Joneses faced each
court battle fearing it could mean the end of their relationship with
the child they had loved and cared for since the child's birth.
Cases like this are rare; however, they highlight an unsettling un-
certainty in the permanency of adoptions that may discourage couples
and individuals from seeking adoption.
2
The real life contested adoption of Florida's Baby Emily mobil-
ized interest and support in the state legislature for changes to Flor-
ida's adoption law, aimed at defining the biological parents' rights
earlier in the adoption process.3 In March 2001, the Florida Legisla-
ture amended the state's adoption law.4 The law expanded the notice
requirement for mothers seeking private adoptions to require notice
to the biological father even when the mother is unsure of his identity
and location.
5
This Note examines the constitutionality of Florida's 2001 Adop-
tion Act in light of the Supreme Court's compelled speech doctrine as
articulated in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind.6 Part I analyzes
the development of the Florida 2001 Adoption Act and its notice re-
quirements. Part II examines the constitutional basis of the putative
father's parental rights. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the
2001 Adoption Act in light of the Supreme Court's compelled speech
decisions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. Part IV discusses the policy implications of the 2001
Adoption Act and recognizes a less intrusive means to achieve the
Florida Legislature's goal of clarifying the putative father's rights ear-
lier in the adoption process. This Note concludes that the 2001 Adop-
2 Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon, Defining the Rights of Unwed Fathers
in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 365 (1996).
3 Id. at 379-80. The Senate Staff Analysis of the Florida Adoption Law states that
"the cumulative effect of the bill is to provide uniformity, continuity, clarification, and
finality regarding proceedings for termination of parental rights and proceedings for
adoption." FLA. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 2001 CS/SB 138: SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 2 [hereinafter SENATE STAFF ANALYsIS].
4 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2001-3 (West).
5 The bill was first introduced shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in the
Baby Emily case, G.W.B. v.J.S.W. (In rethe Adoption of E.A.W.), 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla.
1995). See Kari Barlow, Adoption Statute has Families Feeling Punished, BRADENTON HER-
ALD, Sept. 29, 2002, at 8.
6 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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tion Act is unconstitutional pursuant to the compelled speech
doctrine.
I. FLORIDA'S NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court has recognized some constitutionally pro-
tected rights for men in their illegitimate children under the Four-
teenth Amendment; 7 however, the Court's decisions have left states
without clear guidance about when a putative father's right to partici-
pate in decisions regarding his out-of-wedlock child is constitutionally
guaranteed. Cases concerning children referred to in the media as
Baby Jessica, Baby Richard, and Florida's Baby Emily highlighted the
lack of workable legal or constitutional definitions of unmarried pa-
ternal rights to an unborn or newborn child.8 Putative fathers inter-
ested in raising their illegitimate children have no direction about
when their parental rights are recognized in the law and what steps
they need to take in order to exercise their rights. This uncertainty
7 See Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that a biological
father's constitutional rights were not violated by a California law that recognizes the
biological mother's husband as the child's legal father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983) (holding that constitutionally protected rights for unwed fathers only exist
when the father has significantly participated in his child's upbringing); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a New York law that denied an unwed father
who substantially participated in his children's upbringing the opportunity to contest
adoption proceedings); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that a biological father be provided due process before
his illegitimate children can be removed from his custody).
8 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, three cases of putative fathers con-
testing infant adoptions caught the media's attention. They involved children identi-
fied in the press as Baby Emily, BabyJessica, and Baby Richard. See In re Kirchner, 649
N.E.2d 324 (11. 1995) (Baby Richard); G.W.B. v. J.S.W. (In re Adoption of E.A.W.),
658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (Baby Emily); In re Clauson, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (BabyJessica). Although the cases resulted in different custody awards by
the courts, they are similar in that they illuminate the shortcomings in the way state
adoption laws addressed putative fathers' rights. See generally Resnik, supra note 2, at
366-80. In Baby Jessica's case, for example, after a high-profile, two-and-a-half year
custody battle, BabyJessica was taken from her adoptive parents' home and placed in
the custody of her biological father, whom Jessica had never met. See Sarah K.L.
Chow, Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco): An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Utah's
Adoption Statutes, 2001 BYU L. REv. 349, 350-51. In contrast, Baby Emily was allowed
to remain with her adoptive parents after a three-year custody battle initiated by her
biological father. For a discussion of the Baby Emily case, see supra notes 104-15 and
accompanying text.
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prompted several states, including Florida, to amend their adoption
laws.9
The 2001 Adoption Act, implemented in Florida in October
2001, required the mother to provide notice of the pending adoption
to the biological father. 10 Constructive notice to the biological father
was mandated when his identity and current location were unknown
to the mother." The pregnant woman or the adoption agency was
required to place an ad in a newspaper in every county where concep-
tion could have occurred. 12 The law specifically required that certain
information be included in the notice:
The notice .. .must contain a physical description, including, but
not limited to age, race, hair and eye color, and approximate height
and weight of the minor's mother and of any person the mother
reasonably believes may be the father; the minor's date of birth; and
any date and city, including the county and state in which the city is
located, in which conception may have occurred. 13
The ad had to run once a week for a month and the pregnant
woman or the prospective adoptive parents were forced to bear the
ad's full cost, potentially several thousand dollars. 14 If the putative
9 See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'V 1031, 1032 (2002) ("In the wake of BabyJessica, state legislatures, in an
attempt to avert such disrupted adoptions, [like Babies Emily, Jessica, and Richard]
enacted putative father registries designed to mandate notice of adoptions to unwed
fathers ...."); Chow, supra note 8 passim (discussing proposed changes to Utah law
that address the problems that occur in adoption proceeding due to the legal uncer-
tainty regarding putative fathers' rights).
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088 (West Supp. 2003).
11 Id. § 63.088(5) (West Supp. 2003). Prior to the 2001 Adoption Act, Florida
law required notice only when the when the father's location or identity were known.
The impact of the 2001 law is to extend notice to all biological fathers, even those
who cannot be identified. See SENATE STAFF ANALYsis, supra note 3, at 6.
12 FA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(5) (West Supp. 2003).
13 Id. A typical ad published under the Florida Adoption Act says:
To unknown male: notice of plan for adoption. Mother, [mother's name],
33, is Caucasian with brown hair, brown eyes, 5ft 2in tall, weighs approxi-
mately 1421b, has fair skin and average build. Baby [baby's name], born May
23, 2002, was conceived sometime in August 2001 in Miami or Orlando. Fa-
ther, unknown male, is Caucasian, approximately 30-35 years old, approxi-
mately 6ft tall, fair skin, blond, straight hair, medium build.
Kate Hilpern, Indecent Exposure, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2002, at P8.
14 Barlow, supra note 5 (estimating that the ads will increase the cost of adoptions
between $3300 and $8900); see also Molly McDonough, Adoption Law Challenged in
Florida, ABAJ. E-REP., Aug. 23, 2002 (on file with author) ("The notice requirement
also could inflate costs by requiring all the information in the petition to appear in
the ad.... [T]hey can run as much as $3000 .... [placing] ads in other counties ...
where the birth father could be, and the total costs of a proceeding can double .. ").
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The law generated instant criticism from private adoption agen-
cies, adoptive parents, women's organizations, and both pro-life and
pro-choice groups.16 Charlotte Dancui, a Florida adoption attorney,
sued in the Palm Beach County Circuit Court to challenge the validity
of the law as applied under the state constitution's privacy clause.
17
The Florida Constitution's protection of an individual's right to pri-
vacy provides that "[elvery natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.089(2) (b) (2) (West Supp. 2003) (permitting the parental
termination proceeding to begin sixty days from the first publication date of the con-
structive notice required in the 2001 Adoption Act). Under Florida's statute of limita-
tions, a man who wishes to challenge the termination of his parental rights has one
year from the court's entry ofjudgment terminating his rights to challenge the court's
decision on the grounds of duress. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.182 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004). He has two years from the court's entry ofjudgment to challenge the decision
based on fraud. See id.; see also SENATE STAFF ANALYsis, supra note 3, at 12.
16 See generally Elizabeth Anon, Fla. Adoption Ads Pit Dads' Rights, Moms' Privacy,
FULTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 6, 2002, at 1 (describing the lawsuit challenging the 2001
Adoption Act under the Florida Constitution); Barlow, supra note 5 (presenting po-
tential adoptive parents' and adoption lawyers' criticisms of the 2001 Adoption Act);
Rick Barry, Brand the Young Mothers, End Adoptions, TAMPA TIlB., Aug. 18, 2002, at F15
(characterizing the law as the "Hester Pryne Women's Humiliation Act"); Christina
Cheakalos, Scarlet Want Ads, PEOPLE, Sept. 23, 2002, at 217 (discussing one potential
adoptive family's opposition to the 2001 Adoption Act); Jon-Thor Dahlburg, A 'Scarlet
Letter' is the Law in Florida, PHILADELPHIA INQ., Sept. 29, 2002, at A13 (describing the
various criticisms of the 2001 Adoption Act); Hilpern, supra note 13 (describing the
law as having "a sinister effect on women"); McDonough, supra note 14 (discussing
Florida adoption lawyers' opposition to the 2001 Adoption Act); Katha Pollitt, Slut
Patrol, NATION, Sept. 30, 2002, at 10 (criticizing the 2001 Adoption Act for penalizing
women for having sex); Basu Rekha, Iowa, Florida Shows Contempt for Women's Privacy
Rights, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 8, 2002, at 20 (characterizing the 2001 Adoption Act as
an infringement on women's privacy rights); Bonnie H. Woods, Fla. Law Infringes on
Women's Privacy, ATL.J. CONST., Oct. 4, 2002, atA21 (criticizing the 2001 Adoption Act
for violating women's privacy); Cathy Young, Men's Rights at Women's Expense?, BOST.
GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2002, at A15 ("[The Florida Adoption Act] has been described as
barbaric and misogynistic. An overseas commentator... compared it to the infamous
decree of an Islamic court in Nigeria sentencing a young woman to death by stoning
for bearing a child out of wedlock."); Steven Ertelt, Florida Adoption Law Drives Women
to Have Abortions, at http://www.priestsforlife.org/news/infonet02-08-27.htm (Aug.
26, 2002) (on file with author) (reporting that pro-life and pro-choice groups have
united in opposition to the 2001 Adoption Act).
17 The trial court decision is unpublished. For a description of the case and its
holding, see Laura Hodes, FindLaw Forum: Florida's Law on Single Mothers, Adoption and
Sexual Histories, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/columns/fl.hodes.sexhistory
(Aug. 29, 2002) (on file with author).
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life... ."18 Florida's Supreme Court construed the state constitution's
right to privacy as protecting "the individual['s] interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters,"'19 and "the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions" 20 against government
intrusion. The 2001 Adoption Act implicated both types of protected
privacy interests by requiring disclosure of past sexual partners and,
consequently, placing a burden on women's childbearing and child-
rearing decisions.
Of the six plaintiffs, one was fourteen years old, one had been
impregnated after receiving a date rape drug, and one was impreg-
nated while exchanging sex for drugs.2 1 The Palm Beach County
Court upheld the law except as applied to victims of rape.22 The court
found that although the notice requirement violated a pregnant wo-
man's "reasonable expectation of privacy,"23 the state has a compel-
ling interest in ensuring the biological father has a voice in the
adoption proceedings-except in rape cases.
2 4
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision. In April 2003,
the Florida District Court of Appeals for the Fourth District reversed
and held that the notice provision in the 2001 Adoption Act violated
the Florida Constitution's privacy guarantee. 25 The opinion did not
discuss the contours of the state constitution's right to privacy or pre-
vious cases that might have supported its holding. According to the
court, the invasion of the right to privacy is "so patent in this instance
as to not require our analysis of cases interpreting this constitutional
provision." 26 Interestingly, the state did not participate in the case to
defend the law,2 7 probably because the state legislature was poised to
repeal the 2001 Adoption Act's notice requirements.
Just days after the court of appeals decision, the Florida State Sen-
ate passed House Bill 835,28 eliminating the 2001 Adoption Act's ex-
18 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
19 Rasmussen v. Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987), quoted in
G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
20 Id.
21 See Barry, supra note 16.
22 Hodes, supra note 17.
23 This standard is applied in privacy cases brought under the Florida Constitu-
tion. See SENATE STAFF ANALYsts, supra note 3, at 19-20.
24 Hodes, supra note 17.
25 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
26 Id. at 1062.
27 Id. at 1060.
28 H.R. 835, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003); see Linda Kleindienst, Senate Repeals
Florida's 'Scarlet Letter' Law, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2003, at 5B.
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tensive notification requirement 29 and replacing it with a putative
father registry.30 A putative father registry is a database, maintained
by the state, of men interested in asserting parental rights for any of
his children born out of wedlock. 31 Men who wish to be notified of
adoption proceedings involving their illegitimate child voluntarily add
their name to the registry.32 Under Florida's new law, putative fathers
who fail to register with Florida's registry waive their right to notice of
judicial proceedings involving their newborn children's adoption and
an unregistered putative father's consent to the adoption is not re-
quired.33 Putative father registries provide a mechanism for states to
identify the biological father in order to facilitate the exercise or
timely termination of parental rights.
34
Although Florida repealed the 2001 Adoption Act, other states
have expressed interest in notice requirements like those enacted in
Florida and Congress may consider federal legislation imposing a de-
tailed notice requirement similar to the 2001 Florida law.3 5 As the
Florida appeals court decision rested entirely on the state constitu-
tion, it is not a barrier to the passage of similar laws in other states or
by the federal government.
II. PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS
Historically, putative fathers were not afforded any legal rights in
their illegitimate children.36 If a woman was married, the law recog-
nized her husband as the biological father of her children, regardless
29 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for a description of the notifica-
tion provision.
30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West Supp. 2004) (creating a putative father
registry).
31 SeeJeanette Mills, Comment, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a
Father's Rights with the States Need for a Timely Adoption Process, 62 LA. L. REv 615, 633-35
(2002).
32 Id.
33 Adoption Act of 2003, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2003-58, § 11 (West) (providing that
in newborn adoptions-adoptions of children six months old or younger-putative
fathers who fail to sign up with the putative father registry waive their right to notice
or consent to the adoption of their child).
34 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 425-26.
35 See Kisha Wilson, Brigham Young U.: Utah Considers Bill to Force Pregnant Women to
Reveal Fathers, U-WIRE, MAR. 11, 2003, 2003 WL 14060354; see also Woods, supra note
16 ("Supporters of the 'scarlet letter' law are hoping to get similar laws passed in
other states."). Although states have expressed interest in adopting statues like the
2001 Adoption Act, at the time of printing no legislation has been introduced.
36 See Karen R. Thompson, The Putative Father's Right to Notice of Adoption Proceed-
ings: Has Georgia Finally Solved the Adoption Equation?, 47 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1477-78
(1998) (stating that "[h]istorically, a putative father had no rights in the adoption
2004 ]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
of evidence to the contrary.3 7 The advent of DNA paternity testing in
the twentieth century made changes to the way law treats unmarried
fathers inevitable.38 DNA testing can be 99.9% accurate in determin-
ing paternity;3 9 therefore, society need not depend on marital status
to establish parentage. Consequently, the law has begun to recognize
the parental rights of unwed fathers. 40 The Supreme Court, in a se-
ries of cases that began with Stanley v. Illinois,41 has recognized that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects some
putative fathers' parental rights. 42 The Supreme Court's decisions,
however, have left states with many unanswered questions regarding
the scope and nature of biological fathers' rights in their illegitimate
children.
In contrast, the legal status of a woman in relation to her chil-
dren, born or unborn, has been squarely addressed on several occa-
sions by the Supreme Court. In colonial America, unmarried parents
did not have legally recognized rights in their illegitimate child; illegit-
context until he legitimated his child" and that the mother was the only person identi-
fied by law as an illegitimate child's parent).
37 See Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (pointing out that tradi-
tionally there was a strong presumption of legitimacy that could only be rebutted by
proof that the husband was incapable of impregnating his wife). The California law
at issue in the Michael H. case provides a good example of the preferential treatment
historically afforded to husbands in establishing paternity. See infra notes 87-95 and
accompanying text; see also Edward R. Armstrong, Family Law-Putative and the Pre-
sumption of Legitimacy-Adams and the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes Between the Presumption of
Legitimacy and the Rights of Putative Fathers in Arkansas, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.
369, 370 (2003) ("Prior to 1981 putative fathers simply had no cause of action al-
lowing them to seek a determination of paternity. Furthermore, the legal relation-
ship between married parents and children born into the marriage was protected by a
vigorous common law presumption that all such children were legitimate.") (citations
omitted); Mills, supra note 31, at 617 (discussing that for much of our history unwed
fathers were not afforded any right to participate in the decision to give their illegiti-
mate children up for adoption).
38 See Armstrong, supra note 37, at 369-70 ("[T]he increased scientific certainty
with which we can now determine biological paternity has actually decreased the
moral certainty husbands can have in their legal status as father to the children born
into the marital family.").
39 Cf Armstrong, supra note 37, at 369-70 (discussing the relationship of DNA
testing and putative fathers' legal rights).
40 It was not until the latter part of the twentieth century that parental rights were
legally recognized in putative fathers. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see
also Armstrong, supra note 37, at 369-71 (discussing the impact of DNA testing on the
legal rights of putative fathers).
41 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
42 See supra note 7.
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imate children were thought to belong to no one. 43 By the end of the
nineteenth century, society began to recognize the bond between a
mother and her illegitimate child and the law eventually recognized
an out-of-wedlock child as a member of the mother's family.44 As the
legal parent, mothers have a constitutionally protected right under
the Fourteenth Amendment to make childbearing and childrearing
decisions free from unnecessary government interference.
45
While an unwed woman's parental rights became more strongly
recognized under the U.S. Constitution, unwed fathers' rights have
seemed to be diminished. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey,46 the Supreme Court suggested that men-regard-
43 Karen Dwelle, Adoption Without Consent: How Idaho is Treading on the Constitu-
tional Rights of Unwed Fathers, 39 IDAHo L. REv. 207, 209-10 (2002) (noting that under
English common law, which carried over in the United States, illegitimate children
were considered the children of no one and no legal rights were ascribed to unwed
parents or their illegitimate child).
44 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (holding that illegitimate chil-
dren cannot be denied rights, specifically the right to sue for their mother's wrongful
death, recognized in other children); see also MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS
100-03 (1999); Mary Burbach & Mary Ann Lamanna, The Moral Mother: Motherhood
Discourse in BiologicalFather and Party Cases, 2J.L. & FAM. STUD. 153, 158 (2000) (recog-
nizing that illegitimate children have inheritance rights through their mother's
family).
45 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978) (" [U]nless and until the child
is legitimated, the mother is the only recognized parent and is given exclusive author-
ity to exercise all parental prerogatives .... "); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of "par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children under their control"); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
a woman's right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as to the decision whether the bear or beget a child."); Martin R.
Levy & Elaine C. Duncan, The Impact of Roe v. Wade on Paternal Support Statutes: A
Constitutional Analysis, in FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES 115, 118 (Monroe L. Inker & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1979).
46 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). In Casey, the Court held that a state may not require
a woman to obtain the consent of her husband before obtaining an abortion. Id.; see
also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) ("The Casey decision again con-
firmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child-
rearing, and education."); Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308, 1309-10 (1988). In Smith, the
Court denied a putative father's petition for an injunction to prevent his child's
mother from obtaining an abortion based, in part, on the trial judge's conclusion that
"'although the [putative father] has expressed a legitimate and apparently sincere
interest in the unborn fetus, his interest would not be sufficient to outweigh the Con-
stitutionally protected right of [the mother] to abort her child.'" Id. at 1309.
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less of legal recognition of their parental rights or their marital
status-have no constitutionally protected rights to participate in the
abortion decision. 47 In striking down a Pennsylvania law requiring a
husband's consent for an abortion, the court stated that "[t]he hus-
band's interest in the life of the child [his wife is carrying does] not
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of author-
ity over his wife.... Women do not lose their constitutionally pro-
tected liberty when they marry."48 Historically,
[b]ecause the mother was the only person legally responsible for
the child, most states required her consent to the adoption of a
child born out of wedlock. The putative father was afforded no
right to notice nor opportunity to be heard when the child's mother
unilaterally decided to place their child for adoption. The putative
father was legally powerless to prevent a court from terminating his
parental rights.4
9
The Constitution does not protect putative fathers' rights regard-
ing unborn children; therefore, states may individually determine the
scope of a putative father's rights to participate in childbearing deci-
sions-other than abortion-specifically, the decision to place their
illegitimate child up for adoption.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution provides some protection of a putative
father's rights in his children. 50 In 1972, the Court, in Stanley, held
that under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment the state may not remove illegitimate children
from the custody of their biological father without due process of the
law. 5 ' In Stanley, Peter Stanley lived with his girlfriend for approxi-
mately eighteen years, and they raised their three children together.5
2
When his girlfriend died, the state removed his children and placed
them up for adoption without a hearing pursuant to an Illinois law
declaring all single fathers to be unfit parents. 5 3 In contrast, Illinois
law provided that married parents, divorced parents, and unwed
mothers are entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness as parents
before children could be removed by the state. 54 As an unwed father,
Stanley was not permitted to participate in the adoption and was not
47 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
48 Id. at 898.
49 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 1477-78 (citations omitted).
50 See supra note 7.
51 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
52 See id. at 646.
53 Id. at 646-47.
54 Id. at 647.
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entitled to a fitness hearing under Illinois law.55 The Court held that
the Illinois law was unconstitutional because Illinois could not remove
Stanley's children from his custody without the fitness hearing the
state extended to similarly situated parents.56 According to the Court,
"it follows that denying such a [fitness] hearing to Stanley and those
like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably con-
trary to the Equal Protection Clause." 57 The Court's holding in Stan-
ley seemed to overturn a century of law and practice that did not
recognize parental rights in putative fathers. For the first time, the
Court acknowledged that a father's parental rights in his illegitimate
children were constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
58
Six years later, however, in Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court made
clear that the Constitution protected the parental rights of only a fa-
ther who had exercised "actual or legal custody of his child."59 In
Quilloin, the Court upheld a Georgia statute that denied an unwed
father the opportunity to prevent his child's adoption. 60 Leon Quil-
loin fathered a child with Ardell Williams, although the two were
never married. When their child was three years old, Ardell married
Randall Walcott. Eight years later, when the child turned eleven years
of age, Walcott initiated adoption proceedings to become the child's
legal father.61 The Court held that in circumstances where the puta-
tive father has not "legitimized his offspring," 62 the putative father's
interests are sufficiently distinct from married parents to justify differ-
55 Id. at 648.
56 Id. at 658.
57 Id. (citation omitted).
58 See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of
His Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R. 5th 151 (1998) ("Prior to four landmark
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, the
rights of unwed fathers to any determination regarding their children, particularly in
the context of adoption, were curtailed by state laws . . ").
59 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). The Quilloin decision makes
clear that the constitutional protection discussed in Stanley applies to biological fa-
thers who, like Peter Stanley, had custody and participated in raising their children,
although they never married the children's biological mother. Id.
60 Id. at 249 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975), which provided that "the
consent of the mother alone shall suffice" to free the child for adoption).
61 Id. at 247.
62 Id. at 249. According to the Georgia statute at issue in the case, a child is
legitimized when the father marries the child's mother or obtains a court order that
declares the child is legitimate in the eyes of the law. Id.
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ent treatment under state law.63 Consequently, Georgia's law did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
64
Between 1978 and 1989, the Supreme Court revisited the putative
father rights issue three more times.65 These cases affirmed that legal
recognition of a putative father's parental rights does not rest on biol-
ogy.66 In Caban v. Mohammed, for example, the Court held unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause a New York law that
denied a putative father the right to contest the adoption of his illegit-
imate children. 67 Caban fathered two children with his girlfriend,
Mohammed, while the two lived together.68 Caban provided child
support and participated in his children's lives before and after their
birth.69 After their relationship ended, Caban and Mohammed mar-
ried other people. 70 Mohammed's new husband filed a petition to
adopt her two children, and the Cabans counter-filed to adopt the two
children. 71 Under New York law, a biological mother's consent was
required before the biological father's family could adopt her child; a
father's consent for a mother's adoption petition, however, was not
required. 72 The Court held that the different treatment of parents in
the New York law was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause in cases like this, where both parents substantially participated
in and contributed to their children's upbringing. 73 The decision,
however, made clear that "in those cases where the father never has
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the
63 See id. at 256 ("We think the appellant's interests are readily distinguishable
from those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe that the State
could permissibly give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married fa-
ther."); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) ("If one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either aban-
doned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not pre-
vent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.") (footnotes
omitted).
64 Quilloin, 434 U.S at 256.
65 See supra note 7.
66 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 386 (reviewing the Supreme Court's putative father
decisions and concluding, "[i]f the biological father was unable to establish himself as
a part of his offspring's life, he could not claim a right to veto the child's adoption")
(footnotes omitted).
67 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
68 Id. at 382.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 382-83.
71 Id. at 383.
72 Id. at 384.
73 Id. at 391-93.
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Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from
him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.
'74
The Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson reinforced the Caban
holding.75 In Lehr, Jonathon Lehr brought suit after the child's
mother and her new husband adopted his illegitimate child.76 Under
New York law, fathers who sign up with the state's putative father reg-
istry are entitled to notice of adoption proceedings. 77 Lehr, who did
not sign the registry, argued that the New York law violated his Due
Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by failing to provide him with adequate notice of his child's
adoption. 78 Unlike Caban or Stanley, Lehr never lived with his child's
mother and did not participate in or contribute to his child's upbring-
ing.79 The Court rejected Lehr's claim that biology "give [s] him an
absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
child may be adopted,"80 and held that New York's law did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.81 The Court stated,
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the re-
sponsibilities of parenthood.., his interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause. At that point it may be said that he "acts as a father toward
his children." But the mere existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional protection [to that afforded
mothers] .82
The Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr cases demonstrate that only
those putative fathers that participate in their children's upbringing
benefit from constitutional protection of their parental rights. The
Court's decisions in the putative father cases have been construed as
creating a "Biology Plus Test"8 3 for determining when putative fathers
74 Id. at 392.
75 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983).
76 Id. at 250.
77 Id. at 251.
78 Id. at 253-55.
79 Id. at 252.
80 Id. at 250.
81 See id. at 261, 267-68.
82 Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
83 Resnik, supra note 2, at 385:
An unwed father does not receive constitutionally protected rights by merely
conceiving a child with a woman. In order to trigger the protection of the
Constitution the unwed father must establish a positive and substantial rela-
tionship with his child. Only then does he gain the fight to veto his child's
adoption.
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have constitutionally protected rights. The "Biology Plus Test" re-
quires "an unwed father [to] demonstrat[e] a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in
the rearing of his child.' "84 Absent that commitment, putative fathers
have no constitutionally protected rights in their children and, there-
fore, they are not entitled to notice of their child's adoption.
85
After the Supreme Court's decision in Lehr, it seemed settLed that
an unwed father who had established a relationship with his child
would be guaranteed a voice in adoption proceedings. 86 Six years af-
ter Lehr, the Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,87 again consid-
ered the scope of the putative father's rights. After Michael H., even
those putative fathers who satisfy the "Biology Plus Test" may not be
entitled to constitutional protection of their parental rights.88
In Michael H., Carole, separated from her husband, began a spo-
radic extramarital affair with Michael H. that resulted in an illegiti-
mate child.8 9 Michael H. participated in the child's upbringing from
the time of her birth. 90 Eventually, Carole and Michael's relationship
soured and Carole reunited with her estranged husband, Gerald D.
After Michael and Carole's relationship ended, Michael sought court
ordered visitation rights with their daughter. Gerald D. asserted that
Michael had no visitation right under California law, which recog-
nized the husband as the legal father of any child in the marriage,
unless it is established that the husband was impotent or sterile at the
84 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392
(1979)).
85 See id. at 265; see also Resnik, supra note 2, at 385.
86 The Supreme Court has not elaborated on the type of relationship that is re-
quired to establish a constitutionally protected relationship between an unmarried
man and his biological children. Instead, the Court has offered generalities. For
example, in Lehr the Court held that the putative father must "act as a father toward
his children" and "accept[ ] some measure of responsibility for the child's future."
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n.7
(1979)). See generally Chow, supra note 8, at 355 ("Generally, the Court seemed to
hold that parental rights stem more from the nature of a father-child relationship
than from biological ties.").
87 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
88 Id. (holding that a putative father who provided emotional and financial sup-
port to his biological child did not have legally recognized parental rights because the
law recognized the biological mother's husband as the child's father).
89 Id. at 113.
90 Michael publicly acknowledged that he was the child's father and provided the
child with financial and emotional support. While Michael and Carole were in a rela-
tionship, they shared custody of their daughter. See id. at 114; see also id. at 159
(White, J., dissenting).
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time of conception. 9' Gerald argued that because he was not impo-
tent or sterile, he, as Carole's husband, was the child's legal father.
9 2
Consequently, Michael had no legally recognized rights to his child.
The validity of this law eventually came before the Supreme Court.
Despite the Court's earlier decisions in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban
recognizing constitutionally protected parental rights to unwed fa-
thers that satisfied the "Biology Plus Test," the Court upheld the Cali-
fornia law and refused to recognize Michael H.'s paternal rights.93
Relying on the common law presumption of legitimacy for children
born within a marital relationship, the Court held that Michael had
no constitutionally protected interest in his child 94 and that the Equal
Protection Clause is not a barrier to states extending preferential
treatment to married men in determining parental rights.
9 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. did not abrogate the
"Biology Plus Test," which courts continue to apply in cases that in-
volve paternity of the children of unmarried mothers. 96 The Michael
H. case underscores that biology is only one factor in determining
when a putative father benefits from constitutional protection of his
parental rights. 9 7 According to one commentator, the lesson of the
Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. cases is that "an unwed
father has a constitutionally protected right to establish a relationship
with his child if the biological mother decides to give birth to the
child and is not married to another man, and if he does not delay
assuming his parental role."9 8
By denying certiorari in the high-profile contested adoption cases
involving Baby Emily, Baby Jessica, and Baby Richard, the Supreme
Court has indicated that it is not interested in exploring this issue
further.99 States, in an effort to recognize some parental rights in pu-
tative fathers, are left to balance the relatively undefined constitu-
91 Id. at 115.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 118-32.
94 Id. at 127.
95 Id. at 129-30.
96 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 388.
97 See Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 661 (2002).
98 Toni L. Craig, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed Fathers in
Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 391, 403 (1998) (emphasis added); see also
Buss, supra note 97, at 661 (pointing out that the presence of constitutional protec-
tion of a putative father's rights to his children varies depending on the context).
99 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 389.
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tional rights of biological fathers with the more clearly defined
constitutional rights of biological mothers. 100
States have found it particularly challenging to balance the rights
of biological parents in cases involving newborn adoptions. The Su-
preme Court has not confronted the constitutional status of putative
fathers' rights in newborns and its "Biology Plus Test" has minimal, if
any, application in newborn adoption cases. °10 By eliminating the
common law's absolute rule that unwed fathers have no rights to their
illegitimate children, the Supreme Court has provided a legally cogni-
zable basis for putative fathers to contest adoption proceedings.
10 2
Florida's Baby Emily case illustrates this and the need for state
action to clarify the scope of unwed father's rights.10 3 In 1992, Mr.
and Mrs. Walsh began adoption proceedings for newborn Baby Emily.
The baby's biological father, however, contested the adoption. Al-
though the Walshes loved and cared for the baby as their own, it took
three years and several court battles to complete the adoption and
provide legal recognition and protection of their family unit.
Baby Emily, as she was later known in the press, was three days
old when the Walshes brought her home. 0 4 Her biological mother, a
single woman, decided early in her pregnancy to place Baby Emily up
for adoption. Baby Emily's biological father, Gary, was in a relation-
ship with Baby Emily's mother during her pregnancy; however, he was
not emotionally or financially supportive of his girlfriend's preg-
nancy.10 5 Although Gary showed little interest in his unborn child,
when he received notice of Baby Emily's pending adoption, he re-
fused to relinquish his parental rights and notified the Walshes that
100 See Chow, supra note 8, at 349 (describing the various interests that adoption
laws attempt to take into consideration). See generally Mills, supra note 31 (discussing
the ways that states have tried to address the competing and conflicting interests in-
volved in adoption proceedings).
101 Resnik, supra note 2, at 389. Many courts and state legislatures are hesitant to
apply the "Biology Plus Test" to cases involving paternal rights of newborns because it,
ultimately, is a measure of the father's relationship with the child's mother. For a
description of the "Biology Plus Test," see supra note 83. See infra note 110 for a
discussion of the problems in applying the "Biology Plus Test" to cases involving
newborns.
102 See Campbell, supra note 58, at 151 ("Following the Supreme Court deci-
sions ... unwed fathers have widely challenged ... the termination of their parental
rights in order to permit an adoption.").
103 G.W.B. v. J.S.W. (In re Adoption of E.A.W.), 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1999); see
Resnik, supra note 2, at 390.
104 See Craig, supra note 98, at 393.
105 G.WB., 658 So. 2d at 964.
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he would seek custody.10 6 Florida law requires the consent of certain
biological fathers, unless there is proof of abandonment. 10 7 Evidence
of abandonment severs parental rights.'08 Three years after Emily's
birth, the case went to the Florida Supreme Court.10 9 The court,
holding in favor of Baby Emily's adoptive parents, determined that
Gary's lack of emotional support for Emily's biological mother was
sufficient to establish abandonment. 110 The Walshes, therefore, did
not need Gary's consent of their adoption of Emily.
Although the Florida Supreme Court's decision in the Baby Emily
case was decided on state law grounds, the case demonstrates the diffi-
culties presented by the Supreme Court's line of decisions in Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. The U.S. Supreme Court has
not considered a case involving a putative father's rights concerning
his newborn child; therefore, Florida may define putative father's
rights in newborns as it sees fit. Florida law provides that a known
biological father is entitled to withhold adoption consent unless he
has been found by a Florida court to have abandoned the child. 1'
Similar to the Supreme Court's "Biology Plus Test," abandonment can
be established by evidence that the biological father has failed to pro-
vide emotional and financial support of the mother during her preg-
nancy.'1 2 A problem with this method of establishing a putative
father's parental rights is that it makes the father's parental rights con-
tingent on his relationship with the child's mother-a woman he may
not know is pregnant, that he may not be capable of providing finan-
cial or emotional support for, that he may have a bad relationship
with, or that he may not have any relationship with at all.' 
3
106 Id. at 964-65.
107 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004). Florida law requires
the consent of all men who were married to the mother at the time of the child's
conception or birth, have been established as the father though paternity testing or
court proceedings, or who the mother has identified as a possible father. Id.
108 Id.
109 G.WB., 658 So. 2d at 961.
110 Id. at 967. Many courts have adopted the Supreme Court's "Biology Plus Test"
in cases involving newborn adoptions. For a description of the test, see supra note 83.
In newborn adoptions, the "plus" is evaluated by the putative father's level of emo-
tional and financial support of the biological mother during her pregnancy. See Res-
nik, supra note 2, at 394-99.
111 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.064(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).
112 G.WB., 658 So. 2d at 967 (finding that the biological father had abandoned
his unborn child where he provided no financial or emotional support for the mother
or the child and showed little interest in either the mother or the unborn child).
113 See Craig, supra note 98, at 394-423 (advocating for a "biological rights doc-
trine" to replace the "Biology Plus Test" because of the problems associated with mak-
ing a man's paternal rights dependent on his relationship with the child's mother);
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The solution provided by Florida's 2001 Adoption Act to the
problems posed by imprecise legal standards like the "Biology Plus
Test" was to extend the right to notice and, therefore, the right to
withhold consent for adoption, to all potential biological fathers. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and
Michael H. suggest that states may decide how and when to recognize
putative fathers' rights in their newborn children. It is important to
note, however, that the "hazy boundaries [set by the Supreme Court's
putative father cases] do not justify pushing the edges of those bound-
aries to the point of trampling constitutional rights."'1 14 Unfortu-
nately, Florida's 2001 Adoption Act effort to vest putative fathers of
newborns with legally recognized parental rights has trampled biologi-
cal mothers' constitutional rights.
III. FiRsT AMENDMENT ANALYsIS
Florida's 2001 Adoption Act was intended to clarify the biological
mothers' and fathers' rights to avoid contested adoption cases like
Baby Emily's. 115 Opponents of the 2001 Adoption Act assert that the
law's notice requirement violates the mother's state constitutionally
protected right to privacy.' 16 Although the plaintiffs also asserted that
the law violated the U.S. Constitution's protection of privacy,' 17 the
Florida Appeals Court invalidated the law on state constitutional
grounds.' 8 Generally, adoption laws that compromise the biological
mother's privacy" 9 have withstood challenges brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 20
see also Chow, supra note 8, at 369-70 (arguing in favor of putative father registries
because they allow putative fathers to assert their rights independently of a relation-
ship with or the cooperation of the child's mother).
114 Dwelle, supra note 43, at 226.
115 See Hodes, supra note 17 (citing the Baby Emily case as the primary reason the
state legislature worked to amend Florida's adoption laws); see also SENATE STAFF ANAL-
vsis, supra note 3, at 2 (citing the high-profile contested adoption cases of Baby Emily,
Baby Jessica, and Baby Richard as an impetus for the revision of Florida's adoption
laws).
116 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of...
liberty.., without due process of law."); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (recognizing that the U.S. Constitution protects the right to privacy).
118 For a discussion of the appeals court decision, see supra text accompanying
notes 25-27.
119 For example, laws requiring the mother to reveal the identity of the father to
the state have been upheld against constitutional challenges. See infra note 120.
120 SeeJerome Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights:
Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, in FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LoVERs: LEGAL RIGHTS AND
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The Fourteenth Amendment protects mothers' and fathers' (who
satisfy the "Biology Plus Test") parental rights;12 1 however, it also pro-
tects individuals' speech rights from unwarranted intrusions by the
state. 12 2 The 2001 Adoption Act implicates the right to freedom of
speech in the First Amendment by forcing mothers to reveal informa-
tion they prefer remain private.
According to the Supreme Court, "the right of freedom ... pro-
tected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."
123 Com-
pelled speech challenges have arisen when states have required stu-
dents to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, 124 drivers to display the state
motto on their license plate, 125 newspapers to print responses to edi-
torial criticisms from political candidates, 126 and charities to disclose
to potential donors the percentage of contributions that will actually
be dedicated to the charitable purpose. 127 In all of these cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that state laws compelling speech violated
the speaker's freedom of speech by requiring speech that the speaker
would not ordinarily express.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court first
enunciated the compelled speech doctrine. 128 In Barnette, a group of
Jehovah's Witness challenged the West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion's decision to require students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance
each day before school started. Students who refused to recite the
Pledge could be expelled from school.' 29 The Supreme Court, hold-
ing that the school board's mandate violated the students' free speech
right, said that the First Amendment stands for the proposition that
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 45, at 95, 107. An analysis of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment arguments in these cases is beyond the scope of this Note.
121 See supra Part II.
122 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) ("[T]he
term 'liberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution makes the First
Amendment applicable to the States.").
123 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)) (emphasis added); see also Riley v. Nat'l
Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("[T]he First Amendment guaran-
tees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to
say and what not to say.").
124 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
125 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
126 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
127 Riley, 487 U.S. at 784.
128 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
129 Id. at 626-29.
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individuals are free to express their beliefs. 130 It would be inconsis-
tent with this underlying principle of the First Amendment to allow
the government to force individuals to express ideas that are contrary
to their beliefs.'13' The compelled speech doctrine reflects the notion
that the First Amendment not only encourages the "marketplace of
ideas," but also protects individual autonomy and freedom of thought
and belief.1
32
Before 1988, all of the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating
laws based on the compelled speech doctrine involved government
mandated expressions of opinions or beliefs. 133 In 1988, the Court, in
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,134 held that the
First Amendment protects against government mandated disclosure
of facts, in addition to mandated disclosure of opinions. At the center
of the Riley case was a North Carolina law that required fundraisers for
charitable organizations to disclose to all potential donors the average
percentage of donations actually contributed to the charities.135 In
evaluating the First Amendment claim, the Supreme Court subjected
the law to the highest scrutiny, placing a significant burden of proof
on the state to show that the law was narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling government interest. 136 This level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is
reserved for content-based regulations of speech. According to the
Supreme Court in Riley, strict scrutiny was warranted in the case be-
cause "[m] andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make
necessarily alters the content of the speech."'137 In Riley, the court de-
clared that North Carolina's required disclosure of information re-
lated to charitable fundraising is a content-based restriction 138 and
130 Id. at 634.
131 Id.
132 See Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, The Right Not to Speak and the Prob-
lem of Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1005-07 (2000) (arguing
that the Court's decisions regarding speech restrictions and compelled speech can be
understood as reflecting two values embodied in the First Amendment-the need for
a "marketplace of ideas" in a democracy and protecting individual beliefs and auton-
omy from undue government influence).
133 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
134 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988) (referring to the Court's previous compelled
speech decisions, the Supreme Court said that "[t]hese cases cannot be distinguished
simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we deal
with compelled statements of 'fact': either form of compulsion burdens protected
speech").
135 Id. at 786. The law also required that the fundraiser disclose his/her name
and the name of the professional fundraiser by whom he/she was employed. Id.
136 Id. at 798.
137 Id. at 795.
138 Id. at 798.
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that the First Amendment prohibits "government [from] dictat[ing]
the content of speech absent compelling necessity, and then, only by
means precisely tailored." 139 The Court acknowledged that the state
had an interest in informing potential donors of the percentage of
their contribution that would actually go to the charity; however, the
court did not accept that the state's interest rose to the level of "com-
pelling."'140 The North Carolina law also failed the narrow tailoring
requirement.' 4' The Supreme Court noted that the state could have
achieved its purpose by disclosing information from the financial
forms professional fundraisers are required to submit to the state.
142
State disclosure would serve to provide information to potential do-
nors without requiring fundraisers to disclose information against
their will. 143 North Carolina failed to meet its burden and the Su-
preme Court declared the disclosure law unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.
Similar to the law at issue in Riley, Florida's 2001 Adoption Act
requires the disclosure of specific and detailed information 44 that the
speaker would not disclose absent the government mandate. 145 The
Supreme Court established in Riley that the compelled disclosure of
facts is a content-based regulation of speech that invokes the highest
level of review under the First Amendment. 146
Using the analysis in Riley, the 2001 Adoption Act must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest to withstand
constitutional review. 147 The 2001 Adoption Act fails on both counts.
Unlike mothers, who have a constitutional right to make childbearing
and childrearing decisions, 148 the Supreme Court has held that puta-
tive fathers who fail the "Biology Plus Test" have no constitutionally
139 Id. at 800.
140 Id. at 798 ("[T]he danger the state posits is not as great as might initially
appear.").
141 Id. at 800.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
145 Statistics show that adoptions decreased in the first six months after the law
took effect. See Pollitt, supra note 16. Charlotte Dancui, the attorney that brought the
trial court case, alleged that many women refused to pursue a private adoption after
learning of the notice requirement. See Shana Gruskin, Statute Causes More Abortions,
Lawyer Says, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 2002, at 4B.
146 See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
147 Riley, 487 U.S. at 800.
148 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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protected parental rights. 149 The Constitution, therefore, does not
provide a justification for requiring that all putative fathers receive
constructive notice of adoption proceedings involving their children.
The Palm Beach County Circuit Court, in the first case consider-
ing the Florida Adoption Act, identified several compelling govern-
ment interests to justify the law against the state constitutional right to
privacy challenge. 150 According to the court, the state has compelling
interests in strengthening and maintaining the parent/child bond, es-
tablishing parental rights as quickly as possible, and decreasing the
state's burden to support the child (if the biological father can be
located and is willing and able to provide support).151 The text of the
2001 Adoption Act provides another important, if not compelling,
state interest: to promote a stable and permanent family life for chil-
dren and their biological and adoptive parents.1 52 The Florida Court
of Appeals, however, rejected the trial court's finding that the state
successfully asserted a compelling government interest.153 According
to the court, "the state has failed to demonstrate... how any compel-
ling interest of either the putative father or the state outweighs the
privacy rights of the mother and child in not being identified in such
a personal, intimate, and intrusive manner. ' 154 Additionally, the fail-
ure of the state to appear in court in defense of its law may reflect the
absence of a state interest sufficient to justify the law.
Even if the Palm Beach County Circuit Court correctly identified
a compelling state interest, the law fails the "narrow tailoring" require-
ment. According to the Supreme Court, "even though the govern-
mental purpose [is] legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 155 In Riley, the
Supreme Court evaluated the "tailoring" of the law in view of alterna-
149 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (stating that the substantial
due process protection attaches only "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child'") (citation omitted).
150 Hodes, supra note 17.
151 Id.
152 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (2) (a) (West Supp. 2003); see also Mills, supra note 31,
at 616 (suggesting the state's interests is in quickly freeing a newborn for adoption to
ensure a stable family unit for the child).
153 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
154 Id.
155 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977).
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tive means of accomplishing the same state objectives. 156 Instead of
the explicit and intrusive notice requirement in the 2001 Adoption
Act, the state's goals could be met by implementing a putative father
registry. 157 Putative father registries allow the biological father to as-
sert his paternal rights independently from his relationship with the
biological mother. 58  Putative father registries also allow states to
serve their interests of reducing the state burden of supporting illegiti-
mate children, strengthening parent-child bonds, and clarifying pa-
rental rights to attain a stable family environment for the child early in
adoption proceedings. The task of establishing parental rights lies
solely with the biological father, and only with those fathers who wish
to exercise their parental rights. In comparison, the 2001 Adoption
Act burdens a biological mother seeking an adoption from private
agencies,1 59 and all of the men she has had sex with in the twelve
months before giving birth.1 60 While the information in the putative
father registry is confidential, the 2001 Adoption Act requires women
to publicly expose all men she has had sex with during the previous
year. Putative father registries are a less intrusive, and probably more
successful, 161 way for Florida to achieve its interests.
156 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988); see also Wooley, 430
U.S. at 716-17 ("The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.").
157 Florida did, in fact, consider creating a putative father registry when drafting
the 2001 Adoption Act, but instead decided to enact the expanded notice require-
ments. Some members of the Florida Legislature criticized putative father registries
as "zipper down" measures because they unreasonably require interested fathers to
register every time they "unzip their pants." McDonough, supra note 14. Interest-
ingly, when the 2001 Adoption Act was repealed in April 2003, it was replaced with a
putative father registry. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
158 Putative father registries create a presumption of parental rights, thus reducing
the necessity for tests like "Biology Plus." Cf Craig, supra note 98, at 436 (describing
the model putative father registry-the "Statute Clarifying the Rights of Unwed Fa-
thers in Newborn Adoptions"-as creating a presumption of legitimacy).
159 The disclosure requirement only applied to women who sought private adop-
tions. The most plausible explanation for the different treatment of public and pri-
vate adoptions is that the state did not want to bear the costs for placing the ad. See
Pollitt, supra note 16.
160 The Florida law requires that when the identity of the biological father is un-
known, the biological mother must include in the notice the names or descriptions of
every man she slept within the twelve months preceding the child's birth. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.089 (West Supp. 2003); see also Dahlburg, supra note 16 ("This [act]
is... an intrusion of a woman's privacy and the privacy of the men who were involved
with her .... and the men named in the newspaper may not even be the father.").
161 Some commentators have questioned the ability of constructive notice to alert
any biological fathers of adoption proceedings involving their illegitimate children.
See, e.g., Dahlburg, supra note 16 (quoting adoption lawyer Charlotte Dancui, "the
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In light of "a less drastic means for achieving the same pur-
pose," 162 the 2001 Florida Adoption Act fails the "narrow tailoring"
requirement of strict scrutiny review. Based on the Riley decision, the
2001 Florida Adoption Act is unconstitutional under the compelled
speech doctrine of the First Amendment.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2001 ADOPTION ACT
Regardless of whether the 2001 Adoption Act violates individual
state constitutions or the U.S. Constitution, it is not good policy and
should not be implemented in other states. In the first six months
after the act's implementation, 2000 more abortions were performed
in Florida than in the previous year.163 The 2001 Adoption Act's op-
ponents assert that the increase in abortions is an inevitable conse-
quence of the expanded notice requirement, as women will want to
avoid public exposure of their private activities.
164
Furthermore, the law increased the burden on prospective adop-
tive parents by significantly increasing the costs of adoptions 165 and
made adoptive parents more hesitant to adopt out of concern about
the effect the notice requirement would have on biological
mothers.1 66 Consequently, the number of adoptions in Florida de-
creased after the law took effect.
167
Finally, as of September 2002, one year after the law was imple-
mented, no biological fathers had sought to assert parental rights in
response to the ads.' 68 Given these statistics, the 2001 Adoption Act
seems to have failed at advancing the state's interest in strengthening
men named in the newspaper may not even be the father"); see also Chow, supra note
8, at 369-70 ("In states with a putative father registry, however, as long as an unwed
father timely signs the registry, he will receive notice and the right to consent to the
adoption of his child.").
162 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977).
163 See Gruskin, supra note 145.
164 See id.; Pollitt, supra note 16.
165 Adoption costs the prospective adoptive parents between $15,000 to $25,000.
See H & R Block, Consumer Tips-Can Couples Afford to Adopt, at http://
www.hrblock.com/video-transcripts/afford-adoption.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2003). The ads can increase the costs to adoptive parents by as much as $10,000. See
McDonough, supra note 14.
166 See, e.g., Cheakalos, supra note 16, at 217 (reporting the story of one foster
family that abandoned their effort to adopt their foster child because they were con-
cerned about the impact of the 2001 Florida Adoption Act on the child's mother).
167 See Pollitt, supra note 16; see also Hilpern, supra note 13 ("The Brandon Crisis
Center is not untypical in reporting that the number of women who agree to put their
child up for adoption has dropped more than 20 percent this year.").
168 See Cheakalos, supra note 16, at 218.
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parent-child bonds, identifying biological fathers early in the process,
and clarifying parental rights to attain a stable family environment for
the child early in adoption proceedings.1 69 This may be why the state
legislature amended the law shortly after resuming the legislative ses-
sion in March 2003. Other states that wish to provide additional pro-
tections for putative fathers' legal rights should learn from Florida's
failed experiment with the 2001 Adoption Act. The act, intended to
promote fathers' rights and avoid ugly adoption battles like that over
Baby Emily, has led to increased abortions and decreased adoptions.
As Florida Governor Jeb Bush pointed out, "we should be making
adoption easier, not more difficult, and not stigmatizing women who
are trying to do the right thing."
170
CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Riley, the 2001 Adoption
Act, now repealed, violated the First Amendment's prohibition on
compelled speech by requiring that specific personal information be
printed in newspapers before children can be placed up for adoption.
Constitutional issues aside, the 2001 Adoption Act was bad policy. For
states engaged in their own efforts to balance putative fathers' inter-
ests with the interests of biological mothers and prospective adoptive
parents, Florida's experience demonstrates that expanded notice re-
quirements are not the answer.
The Florida Legislature wisely implemented a state putative fa-
ther registry, already in existence in thirty states. 17' Putative father
registries provide rights to those men who wish to care for their chil-
dren without making their rights dependent on their relationship
with the biological mother, and without invading either biological
parent's right to privacy concerning their sex lives.
169 See Dahlburg, supra note 16.
170 Id.
171 See Pollitt, supra note 16.
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